Recent years have witnessed major innovations in mobile crowdsourcing networks. For selfish participants,\nconventional methods resort to incentive mechanism design for resource utilization, which might overlook the\ninherent equilibrium property among mobile users. In contrast to these proposals, we investigate the problem that\nwhether or not the selfish users could be enabled to endorse stable task sharing with balanced allocations without\nincentive mechanism designs. Before making a positive answer to this problem, we need to address the following\nchallenge, i.e., users have to make their balancing decisions with only very limited and dynamic local load information,\nwhich could possibly incur longer convergence time and imbalanced task allocations. In tackling this difficulty, we\npropose two distributed selfish load balancing schemes, the max-weight best response policy for strong information\nscenario, where load information could be sufficiently collected; and the proportional allocation policy for weak\ninformation scenario. We make experimental studies to validate proposed schemes. In our simulation study with real\ntrace data, the proposed schemes converge fast in many typical settings with fairly good balancing performance. As\nfor data traces from RollerNet (Tournoux et al., The accordion phenomenon 2009), the performance of load balancing\nand convergence property are further validated.
Loading....